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I thoroughly enjoyed the opportunity to engage with the important ideas 
presented in Professor Huntington’s Article “Familial Norms and 
Normality.”
1
  I hope that my comments accurately capture her major points 
and reflect the importance of the topics she addresses.  My comments are made 
in the spirit of engaged academic exchange and seek not only to take her 
Article seriously, but also to encourage her to expand and develop further the 
significant concepts with which she is working. 
INTRODUCTION 
Professor Huntington grounds her Article on the assertion that emotion 
generally plays a critical role in shaping both formal law and social norms.  
She asserts that the impact of emotion on social norms—a relationship that is 
both under-explored and under-theorized in legal scholarship—is most 
significant when it comes to regulation of the family.  She presents the 
centrality of social norms to the family as “indirect” regulation, in contrast to 
formal, legal arrangements.  While many commentators recognize that social 
norms are part of the regulatory mechanism for the family, Professor 
Huntington observes that few have addressed the significant role of the state in 
both the manipulation and the generation of the emotions that comprise, 
inform, and shape those norms.  That is, the state not only creates law, but it 
also generates and harnesses emotion to construct social norms.  In particular, 
Professor Huntington concludes that two contemporary approaches to social 
norms—rational-choice theory and law-and-society scholarship—have failed 
to adequately take into account the role of emotion in the formulation of social 
norms.  This is the task that she sets for herself in the Article, with the 
objective of showing how understanding and employing the relationship 
between emotion and social norms may lead to more positive and pluralistic 
regulation of the family by the state.  To that end, she urges that in addition to 
 
  Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law, Director of Feminism and Legal Theory Project, Emory 
University School of Law. 
 1 Clare Huntington, Familial Norms and Normality, 59 EMORY L.J. 1103 (2010) (Article). 
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laws, social norms should be explicitly and transparently cultivated and 
promoted by the state through subtle “norm entrepreneurship.”
2
 
Professor Huntington’s exploration of the potentially positive role for 
emotion and social norms in rethinking the place of the state in family 
regulation is an important contribution to the field.  In calling for a more 
realistic approach to the variety and range of family emotions, she persuasively 
argues there is a need for widespread reexamination of the assumptions and 
beliefs (and emotions) informing social norms governing the family.  In 
positing an active role for the state beyond formal law, she correctly positions 
the state as involved\ in the actual construction and imposition of informal, 
extra-legal modes of regulation, thus making the case for state responsibility in 
both the reexamination and reformulation of social norms. 
However, in order to accomplish the ambitious tasks she sets out for 
herself, I suggest that she should give more attention to clarifying the meaning 
of key concepts.  Elaboration of certain assertions and terms would strengthen 
her observations and arguments, making both more persuasive.  In the 
following Parts, I raise some key issues and questions regarding the concepts 
and terms that warrant further development and articulation. 
I. THE STATE 
At a basic and very preliminary level, Professor Huntington should supply 
the reader with her vision of “the state.”  As envisioned in her Article, the state 
seems rather monolithic and omnipotent.  Its capabilities and processes are 
described in anthropomorphic terms in that the state is seen as acting as the 
result of some unitary motive or to achieve a well-defined objective.
3
 
A. The Fragmented State 
Whatever else it may be, the state is not a monolithic entity; nor is there 
only one state with which to be concerned.  When it comes to family and 
intimacy issues in particular, the state should be seen as fragmented and 
multiple in form, with various components that are often duplicative and 
frequently in contention with one another.  On the most obvious level, there are 
multiple states involved with families and family laws.  In governance or law 
making, we have a federalist system—a national government coexistent with 
 
 2 Id. at Part III.A (examining emotion and state norm entrepreneurship).  
 3 Id. at 1105. 
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multiple state entities.  These overlapping sources of potential family 
regulation are complimented and complicated by local and regional authorities 
that also can adopt policy and rules (and certainly can influence understandings 
of social norms and emotions). 
But even considered independently and individually, these multiple 
manifestations of the state are not free to act unencumbered.  They are 
composed of various bodies that are supposed to “check” and “balance” the 
process of governance.
4
  Legislatures, courts, and executives are governed (or 
regulated) by myriad rules, conventions, constitutional mandates, and 
geographical and ideological constraints.  Some of these are externally 
imposed, but many are processed internally—interpreted and implemented by 
the various departments, agencies, officials, bureaucracies, and other entities 
that may make up any individual state.  This is the “separation of powers” 
point, but it also reflects the reality that any individual state is really a variety 
of complementary, overlapping, dynamic, contingent, and interactive 
segments. 
Further, it seems obvious to me that it is the individuals within these sets of 
institutional arrangements who act as or for the state.  This raises additional 
questions about how one determines which actions and motivations can be 
attributed to “the state” and which actions or motivations are more properly 
attributed to those who populate (however temporarily) its law-making 
structures.  When acting in their capacity as state officials, individuals are 
constrained by various factors, including laws and processes as noted above, 
but individual characteristics and contexts also influence individual behavior.  
In understanding how and why these individuals act within their official 
governmental positions, we might have to also consider their political position, 
ambition, and prospects for reelection or reappointment.  We could also factor 
in an individual’s ideology, personal relationships, native ability, biases, and so 
on.
5
  My question is whether the individuality and particularity of beliefs, 
politics, and contexts influencing those individuals who act for the state 
 
 4 A modern state is made up of various components, typically including a legislative body, an executive, 
a judiciary, and various agencies and commissions. 
 5 Another way to make this point is to ask if social norms actually inform and constrain how individuals 
acting in a state capacity behave.  Might social (and professional) norms independently affect how these actors 
participate in the construction and manipulation of social norms in attempts to regulate the family? 
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undermines the idea that the state can be conceptualized as acting to 
accomplish a singular goal or objective.
6
 
B. The State as Actor and Agent 
Professor Huntington’s analysis would also benefit greatly from specific 
articulation of her understanding of the process by which the state as an actor 
or agent uses emotions for the creation and maintenance of social norms.  This 
raises more than simply the “who” question identified in the preceding section; 
it also raises very important “how” and “why” questions—that is, how exactly 
does the state act and how can we determine state purpose or motivation with 
any specificity.  I think these types of inquiry fatally complicate the idea of 
single-purpose state action. 
Professor Huntington seems to view the state as acting as an entity.  For 
example, she posits that the state can through its actions, by sending particular 
messages, change the “emotional context of intimate and personal decision 
making.”
7
  This seems to view the state as capable of acting (successfully and 
forcefully) as a single unified unit.  One page of the Article presents the state 
as regulating, influencing, affecting, using, creating, and manipulating either 
emotions and social norms or families themselves.
8
  In the section discussing 
the state as a norm entrepreneur, we are told that there is a possibility of the 
state “actively shaping ground-level social norms by changing the emotional 
content of decision making.”
9
  In the sections on “What the State Does” and 
“How the State Does It,” the ability to choose to further a value, to act in a 
covert manner potentially subverting the democratic process, to send hidden 




 6 When we think of states and the authority of law or norms, we also should include many of the quasi-
public institutions that intersect with formal states and act under the authority of law.  In other words, the state 
can also be manifested through complex institutional arrangements that don’t have the imprimatur of formal 
government but can powerfully affect norms.  Such entities also are state actors in that state acts brought them 
into legally recognized existence, and they often operate under particular state mandates or regulatory regimes.  
In fact, Nancy Cott has argued that the state actually constitutes itself through the legal recognition and 
subsequent regulation of societal institutions like the family.  See Nancy F. Cott, Giving Character to Our 
Whole Civil Polity: Marriage and the Public Order in Late Nineteenth Century, in U.S. HISTORY AS WOMEN’S 
HISTORY 107 (L.K. Kerber, A. Kessler-Harris & K.K. Sklar eds., 1995) (giving a historian’s perspective on the 
family as an institution).  Professor Cott states that “one might go so far as to say the institution of marriage 
and the modern state have been mutually constitutive” and further that “one of the principal means that the 
state can use to prove its existence . . . is its authority over marriage.”  Id. at 109. 
 7 Huntington, supra note 1, at 1103. 
 8 Id. at 1107. 
 9 Id. at 1154. 
 10 Id. at 1154–56. 
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One example from Professor Huntington’s Article is illustrative of why I 
find it problematic to talk about actions such as manipulation of emotions or 
construction of social norms as undertaken by “the state.”  She asserts that 
there are some political actors who use “proxy fights” in seeking to influence 
women considering an abortion.
11
  The fights she discusses are those creating 
“indirect barriers to abortion,” such as requiring a woman to view a sonogram 
of the fetus before being given access to an abortion.
12
  “The goal is to create a 
norm that stigmatizes abortion . . . . seeking to impose, cultivate, or evoke the 
emotions of motherhood in all pregnant women.” 
13
  According to Professor 
Huntington, a further example of measures that “play a particular role in the 
‘culture of life’”
14
 are the infant safe haven laws that, while “facially 
unobjectionable,” have as their “deeper meaning . . . pro-life social norm 
entrepreneurship . . . seek[ing] to change the emotional resonance of the 
abortion decision.”
15
  Recognizing that abortion is an event that may have 
emotional resonance without state contribution, Professor Huntington 
concludes nonetheless that “the state is privileging and emphasizing one set of 
emotions[,] . . . . manipulating the emotional context of decision making.”
16
  
We are not told who or what acts as the state in this context or how in so acting 
state’s purpose is revealed in this analysis, perhaps because the answers are 
supposed to be obvious. 
But when the state acts, it does so through a complex set of institutional 
relationships and actions; it is hardly a monolithic entity moving forward with 
one mind or urged on by one motivation.  Passing a law or explicitly stating 
policy in a legislative debate is a more transparent and public activity than 
norm creation or the manipulation of emotion, and therefore these activities are 
more open to analysis and critique.  However, the legislative process requires a 
variety of actions on the part of the state: study, investigation, fact finding, and 
 
 11 Id. at 1133. 
 12 Id. at 1134.  She also includes “extra-legal efforts,” such as claims that women later regret abortions, 
as an example of the creation of a culture of life.  Id. at 1134.  These are viewed as attempts to “shape an anti-
abortion social norm by changing the individual and cultural dimension of the emotions associated with 
abortion.”  Id. at 1134. 
 13 Id. at 1134.  A page later, Huntington’s Article reveals that a woman may sign a waiver and decline to 
view the ultrasound.  Id. at 1135.  Such a legislative escape route suggests that the state may have been of at 
least two minds on the sonogram issue.  Rather than “choos[ing] this method because it is so effective at 
conveying the state’s preferred narrative,” id. at 1135, perhaps the norm of individual choice just bumped the 
norm of fully informed decision making, confusing the state. 
 14 Id. at 1134 (quoting Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 753, 753 (2006)). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 1136. 
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negotiation involving legislators and, their staffs, as well as others such as 
experts and interest groups who are brought into the process.  Legislating also 
involves agencies and other mechanisms of executive power with 
implementation authority, as well as the judiciary, which has a key role in 
resolving disputes.  Which acts count as state acts, particularly when there is 
some inconsistency or disagreement among these actors?  Do we only look at 
the last act (assuming there is one)?  Or do we perhaps look just at final 
legislation, leaving aside negotiation, compromise, and reconciliation within 
the legislature as well as subsequent executive enforcement or judicial review? 
It seems to me that the idea of a monolithic state is even more incoherent 
when we consider attributing attitudes, objectives, or motivation to a single 
thing called “the state.”  Professor Huntington should address how a complex 
entity like the state arrives at a single objective, or even a set of objectives, on 
an issue like abortion or other similarly highly contested policy matters.  In 
addition, I am unsure of how we can determine with any certainty the 
definitive motivations for specific legislation.  Further, what is the significance 
of inconsistent or contested positions in determining state objectives or 
motivation?  An advocate of infant safe haven laws might genuinely want to 
save newborns from abandonment, quite independent of his or her position on 
the right of a woman’s choice when it comes to abortion.  Is it correct to ignore 
that motivation or to consider it trumped for purposes of academic criticism 
just because another (devious pro-life) legislator really wants to stigmatize 
abortion in any way possible?  Which desires, objectives, and motivations of 
which state actors should count? 
II. SOCIAL NORMS AND EMOTION 
A second welcome set of clarifications and amplifications would center on 
Professor Huntington’s use of the terms “social norms” and “emotions.”  Both 
are employed in various, sometimes confusing, way that incorporate both 
“hard” and “soft” meanings for each term.
17
  From a theoretical perspective, I 
prefer to work with the harder versions, but I recognize that perhaps only the 
softer manifestations allow Professor Huntington to make her boldest claims. 
 
 17 I use “hard” to denote concise, clear, defined terms or categories.  “Soft,” by contrast, indicates 
blurred, ambiguous, or shifting categories. 
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A. Social Norms 
Professor Huntington sets out the very broad proposition that social norms 
are “the rules of behavior that individuals follow despite the absence of legal 
obligation or formal penalty for noncompliance.”
18
  In talking about non-legal 
systems of behavioral regulation, the interesting question arises as to why 
individuals would comply with social norms, particularly if compliance is 
against their preferences or values or even merely inconvenient.  Law carries 
with it the prospect of formal sanction and coercion or incorporates incentives 
and subsidies, but what equivalent enticements are inherent in social norms? 
Professor Huntington observes that the idea underlying social norms theory 
is that such norms influence people because individuals are social beings who 
are attentive to others’ views, seek approval, and alter their behavior to avoid 
disapproval.  However, she does not seem to sufficiently contemplate this 
question of the relationship between social norms and sanctions.  Certainly 
there must be some relationship.  If the sanction is slight, incidental, or 
insignificant, an individual may well ignore the norm.  Absent some 
significant, clearly evident sanction, perceived self-interest may trump any 
specific social norm.  In fact, if the sanction is uncommunicated, minimal, or 
insignificant, there may even be a question as to whether something should be 
labeled a social norm at all. 
Debates about how social norms should be understood and classified have 
persisted for over a century.
19
  Social proscriptions and prescriptions grouped 
under the category of social norms clearly exist along a variety of spectrums.  
They can be classified according to characteristics like formality or severity of 
sanction, specificity or explicitness in the statement of the norm, source[s] of 
authority, socialization process whereby the norm is transmitted (family, 
school, or media), or patterns of deviance from the norm, to name just a few.  
Particularly relevant to the notion that norms can influence behavior (and thus 
have the predictive possibilities Professor Huntington desires) would seem to 
 
 18 Huntington, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1105. 
 19 See WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMMER, FOLKWAYS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF 
USAGES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, MORES AND MORALS 34–43 (1906) (proposing classification of norms into 
folkways and mores); see also PITIRIM A. SOROKIN, SOCIETY, CULTURE, AND PERSONALITY: THEIR 
STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS 87 (1969) (criticizing Summer and developing a more focused classification 
scheme including law norms, technical norms, and norms of etiquette and fashion along with more amorphous 
norms). 
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be the longstanding distinction between what have historically been labeled 
“absolute” and “conditional” norms.
20
 
More than fifty years ago, Richard Morris explained the differences 
between these poles of norm classification by characterizing an absolute norm 
as one “which is known and supported by everyone, which applies to 
everybody under all conditions, which is rigorously enforced by heavy 
sanctions.”
21
  By contrast, conditional norms are of limited application and 
sporadic enforcement.
22
  Examining this distinction suggests points of inquiry 
that further complicate the notion of a predictable causal line between social 
norms and human behavior. 
Is a social norm clearly universally applicable, or is it merely one of several 
acceptable or contested alternatives?  And if it is an alternative, is there a 
hierarchy of norms?  Is there any interpretive flexibility in the articulation of 
the social norm, or is it specific and detailed?  Ultimately, what is the context 
for enforcement, particularly, what extent and degree of power does the 
enforcement community exerts over the individual?  In regard to this last 
inquiry, it would seem to make a significant difference if the non-legal 
sanction were nothing more than a shake of the head with a “tsk-tsk”—
especially when compared to excommunication from a religious body with 
which the individual shares a fundamental belief about the terms of salvation.  
I wonder how each of the situations set forth in the Introduction to Professor 
Huntington’s Article should be sorted using such classification possibilities
23
: 
A young boy hits his brother in a crowded subway. 
A young woman and man are trying to decide whether to marry, 
move in together, or remain in separate homes. 
A thirty-nine-year-old single woman considers using donated sperm 
to become pregnant and raise a child on her own. 
A gay couple puzzles through who should attend the Mother’s Day 
celebration at their children’s school. 
A mother contemplates breastfeeding her baby in a crowded public 
park. 
 
 20 Or, in my terms, hard and soft norms. 
 21 Richard T. Morris, A Typology of Norms, 21 AM. SOC. REV. 610, 612 (1956).  Under this definition, 
there are at least three stages: generation and acceptance, universal application, and implementation through 
sanctions.  Norms that complement or supplement legal rules may also be deemed absolute, and the law or 
legal institutions may play a role in assisting the transmission and acceptance of norms and non-legal 
sanctions. 
 22 Id. 
 23 The following list of situations is set forth in paragraph format in Huntington, supra note 1. 
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A teenager considers having sex with his girlfriend. 
A closeted lesbian ponders bringing her partner to the annual holiday 
party. 
A visibly pregnant woman decides whether to order a glass of wine 
in a restaurant. 
A woman considers terminating her pregnancy. 
A family thinks seriously about homeschooling their young children. 
Is a young couple’s decision to marry, cohabitate, or remain in separate 
homes—with all of the concrete benefits that may flow from that decision (tax 
incentives, health and welfare benefits, and formal legal entitlements)—really 
motivated by the same type of norm processing as a parent’s reaction to a 
young boy’s choice to hit his brother in a subway?  Is a single, thirty-nine-
year-old woman’s decision to become pregnant using donated sperm really 
governed by the same social norm calculus as an individual teenager’s decision 
to have sex with his girlfriend?  Professor Huntington’s assertion that all these 
situations fall under the broad classification of “social norms” seems in need of 
further refinement. 
As I indicated earlier, I prefer a harder version (meaning more universal, 
specific, heavily sanctioned, or absolute) of the concept of social norms.  If the 
concept is too loosely theorized, it loses all analytic and predictive force.  This 
is not to say that there may be some social conventions or customs with 
normative implications (but lacking strong sanctions) or personal values
24
 that 
come into play in these situations.  However, I question whether in twenty-
first-century America most, if any, of the above situations are governed by 
anything that could be considered close to an absolute norm—in the sense that 
it is coherent, clearly dominant, and works to predict individual behavior on a 
wide scale.  This point is more than a quibble with the situations selected; it is 
the assertion that if the enforcement community is too small or localized and 
unique, the concept is trivialized by labeling it as a social norm.
25
  A more 
acceptable characterization would be to say that within these given contexts 
(such as the workplace of the closeted lesbian or the family of the woman 
 
 24 Professor Huntington does not address the relationship between values and norms in her Article.  One 
distinction is that norms require a community and consensus, while values are held individually and may 
overlap, or be coexistent with, or reflective of, social norms.  Since they are internalized on an individual level, 
values can even be in opposition to social norms and may be a more potent influence on and predictor of 
individual behavior. 
 25 The smaller and more unique the community of enforcement, the more successfully the individual can 
escape to the moral security of other normative orders or hide their “deviation” from surveillance and 
response. 
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considering abortion) there might be constraints or expectations (norms and 
sanctions associated with those specific communities) that could structure 
individual decision making. 
B. Emotions 
I also have some difficulty understanding of what is encompassed within 
Professor Huntington’s concept of “emotion.”  The category seems very elastic 
and over-inclusive.  This over-inclusiveness is evident in Professor 
Huntington’s description of emotions
26
 and in her analysis of the roles of 
emotion.
27
  Descriptively, emotion is articulated through a series of examples, 
rather than a conceptual definition.  As a human phenomenon, Professor 
Huntington asserts that “emotion” may be the individual disgust felt by an 
opponent of gay marriage toward a lesbian couple or the collective opinion of 
groups mobilized to promote child welfare.
28
  In the first example, emotion is a 
feeling, but in the second it is an opinion or belief.  In the former, emotion is 
individual, but in the latter it is collective.  Describing emotion using such 
divergent examples makes it very difficult for the reader to deduce a cogent 
theory or definition. 
Professor Huntington repeatedly describes emotion as “integral to family 
life,”
29
 “interwoven into every aspect of our lives,”
30
 “at the center of the 
[same sex marriage] debate,”
31
 “the currency that enforces parenting social 
norms,”
32
 and a “key component of reason.”
33
  Each of these characterizations 
emphasizes the significance of emotion without actually defining it.  By virtue 
of its ubiquity, emotion seems not only to permeate nearly everything but to 
include it as well.  Is it really emotion that serves as both the content of, and a 
compliance factor for, a norm?  Are there other factors beyond emotion, such 
as formal legal structures, individual behavior, institutional arrangements, or 
material circumstances, that further affect the viability of a norm?  A narrower 
definition of emotion would provide for a more precise analytical framework 
equipped to confront such questions. 
 
 26 Huntington, supra note 1, at 1105. 
 27 Id. at 1147. 
 28 Id. at 1106. 
 29 Id. at 1168. 
 30 Id. at 1106. 
 31 Id. at 1124. 
 32 Id. at 1142. 
 33 Id. at 1120. 
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Professor Huntington falls into a similar pattern of unduly elastic 
boundaries in her analysis of the roles of emotion.  She presents four categories 
for the roles of emotion vis-à-vis social norms: “emotion as the content of a 
norm,” “emotion as the instigator of a norm,” “emotion as a compliance 
factor,” and “emotion as a complicating factor.”
34
  By rendering emotion the 
content, the catalyst, the regulator, and the complicater of norms, she equates 
emotion with a series of different psycho-social phenomena.  Does Professor 
Huntington really mean that emotion is all of these things?  If so, what is the 
purpose of addressing social norms if emotion essentially eclipses them?  A 
more precise definition of emotion would better clarify the real value of this 
theory to the law and the state. 
III.  IN SEARCH OF THE SAVANNAH 
Professor Huntington has presented us with a forceful account of why 
understanding emotion is essential to understanding how social norms—and 
thus family law regulation—work.  The important and ultimate purpose of this 
project is to facilitate the development of more creative and effective state 
interventions in family life.  I share with Professor Huntington the ambition of 
imagining a more effective and responsive state when it comes to family 
policy.  There is a need for the state, however conceived, to be more 
responsive to the realities of individuals and families.  By engaging with the 
concepts of emotion and social norms, as well as interrogating the role of the 
state in regulation of the family through informal means, Professor Huntington 
has raised some intriguing avenues for further exploration. 
In concluding her Article, Professor Huntington concedes that her efforts to 
examine the role of emotion in family law (and family norms) have not 
presented an exact theory that finds “a savannah between the desert of rational-
choice accounts and the swamp of law-and-society accounts.”
35
  I hope my 
comments will provide some small footholds or guideposts as she pushes 
toward further development of such a theory. 
 
 
 34 Id. at 1147–48. 
 35 Id. at 1150. 
